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March 22, 1996

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MAR 25 1996

Mr. William F. Caton
Acting Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW
Room 222
Washington, D.C. 20554

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
OFFICE OF SECRETARY

DOCKET FILE COPY ORIGINAL

RE: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
CC Docket No. 95-185

Dear Mr. Caton:

Attached please find the appropriate number of TRACER's Reply
Comments in the above-referenced proceeding. Please also find
attached copies of letters transmitting these Reply Comments to
the Chairman, fellow Commissioners, and Ms. Michele Farquhar,
Chief of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau.

Sincerely,

ATER WYNNE HEWITT DODSON & SKERRITT, P.C.



Arthur A. Butler
Counsel for TRACER

Enclosures

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**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
OFFICE OF SECRETARY**

The Honorable Reed E. Hundt
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street NW, Room 814
Washington, D.C. 20554

RE: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
CC Docket No. 95-185

Dear Chairman Hundt:

Enclosed please find a copy of TRACER's Reply Comments in the
above-referenced proceeding.

TRACER, an organization of large business users of
telecommunications services in the State of Washington, strongly
supports the Commission's tentative conclusion to adopt bill and
keep to govern interconnection compensation arrangements between
LECs and CMRS providers on an interim basis and urges the
Commission to take prompt action in this matter.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding TRACER's
position in this matter, please do not hesitate to call me at
(206) 623-4711.

Sincerely,

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Arthur A. Butler
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March 22, 1996

The Honorable James H. Quello
Commissioner
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW
Room 802
Washington, D.C. 20554

RE: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
CC Docket No. 95-185

Dear Commissioner Quello:

Enclosed please find a copy of TRACER's Reply Comments in the
above-referenced proceeding.

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telecommunications services in the State of Washington, strongly
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(206) 623-4711.

Sincerely,

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March 22, 1996

The Honorable Rachelle B. Chong
Commissioner
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW
Room 844
Washington, D.C. 20554

RE: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
CC Docket No. 95-185

Dear Commissioner Chong:

Enclosed please find a copy of TRACER's Reply Comments in the
above-referenced proceeding.

TRACER, an organization of large business users of
telecommunications services in the State of Washington, strongly
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position in this matter, please do not hesitate to call me at
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Sincerely,

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March 22, 1996

The Honorable Andrew C. Barrett
Commissioner
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW
Room 826
Washington, D.C. 20554

RE: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
CC Docket No. 95-185

Dear Commissioner Barrett:

Enclosed please find a copy of TRACER's Reply Comments in the
above-referenced proceeding.

TRACER, an organization of large business users of
telecommunications services in the State of Washington, strongly
supports the Commission's tentative conclusion to adopt bill and
keep to govern interconnection compensation arrangements between
LECs and CMRS providers on an interim basis and urges the
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(206) 623-4711.

Sincerely,

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March 22, 1996

The Honorable Susan Ness
Commissioner
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW
Room 832
Washington, D.C. 20554

RE: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
CC Docket No. 95-185

Dear Commissioner Ness:

Enclosed please find a copy of TRACER's Reply Comments in the
above-referenced proceeding.

TRACER, an organization of large business users of
telecommunications services in the State of Washington, strongly
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keep to govern interconnection compensation arrangements between
LECs and CMRS providers on an interim basis and urges the
Commission to take prompt action in this matter.

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position in this matter, please do not hesitate to call me at
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Sincerely,

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March 22, 1996

Ms. Michele C. Farquhar
Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
1025 M Street, NW
Room 5002
Washington, D.C. 20554

RE: Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
CC Docket No. 95-185

Dear Ms. Farquhar:

Enclosed please find a copy of TRACER's Reply Comments in the
above-referenced proceeding.

TRACER, an organization of large business users of
telecommunications services in the State of Washington, strongly
supports the Commission's tentative conclusion to adopt bill and
keep to govern interconnection compensation arrangements between
LECs and CMRS providers on an interim basis and urges the
Commission to take prompt action in this matter.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding TRACER's
position in this matter, please do not hesitate to call me at
(206) 623-4711.

Sincerely,

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Arthur A. Butler
Counsel for TRACER

Enclosure

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**BEFORE THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of)	
)	
Interconnection Between Local)	
Exchange Carriers and)	CC Docket 95-185
Commercial Mobile Radio)	
Service Providers)	

REPLY COMMENTS OF TRACER

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March 22, 1996

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**BEFORE THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of)
)
Interconnection Between Local)
Exchange Carriers and) CC Docket 95-185
Commercial Mobile Radio)
Service Providers)

REPLY COMMENTS OF TRACER

Introduction and Summary

As an association of significant users of wireless and landline telecommunication services, the Washington Telecommunications Ratepayers Association for Cost-based and Equitable Rates ("TRACER") strongly supports the Commission's tentative conclusion to adopt "bill and keep" as the appropriate compensation mechanism for interconnection between Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") providers and Local Exchange Carriers ("LECs").

TRACER has a long history of intervening in proceedings similar to this one before the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission ("WUTC"), arguing in favor of policies that encourage competition in the local exchange market and prevent incumbent LECs from abusing their market power. TRACER members strongly believe that competition is capable of doing a better job than regulation of achieving public policy goals of lowering the prices consumers must pay, improving service quality, and spurring greater innovation. However, in order for

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1 competition to be successful at achieving these goals, it is
2 essential that rational interconnection policies be adopted. If
3 new entrants are burdened with unnecessarily high interconnection
4 costs, competition will effectively be precluded from providing
5 any meaningful downward pressure on rates.

6 Consistent with its desire to see an effectively competitive
7 market develop for all telecommunications services, TRACER
8 recently argued successfully that the WUTC should adopt "bill and
9 keep" for interconnection between incumbent LECs and Competitive
10 Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs").¹

11 Bill and keep should also be adopted for interconnection
12 between landline and wireless providers. The present
13 compensation system, under which unjustified, one-sided cash
14 payments are made to LECs for terminating traffic, imposes an
15 unnecessarily high cost on existing CMRS providers, which, in
16 turn, represents an especially high barrier to new entrants
17 (providers of Personal Communication Services (PCS)). TRACER
18 firmly believes it is not in the public interest.

19 The cost savings realized from a bill and keep policy will
20 allow CMRS carriers to better position themselves as competitors
21 in the local exchange market, as many PCS carriers apparently
22 intend to do. It is clear, especially given the analysis in the
23 initial comments, that LECs not only have the motivation to

24 ¹ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission v U S
25 WEST Communications, Inc., Docket No. UT 941464. The WUTC
26 issued an order requiring incumbent LECs and CLECS, on an interim
basis, to exchange traffic on a bill and keep basis

1 prevent such competition through inflated interconnection rates,
2 but have acted consistent with this underlying motivation.

3 TRACER urges the Commission to put an end to the unfairly
4 imbalanced existing interconnection bargaining process by
5 adopting a bill and keep compensation scheme for LEC/CMRS carrier
6 interconnection.

7 I. GENERAL COMMENTS.

8 TRACER is a 12-year-old organization representing a number
9 of the State of Washington's largest telecommunications users,
10 primarily before the WUTC. TRACER's members include large
11 entities engaged in the manufacturing, timber products, financial
12 service, and health care service industries.

13 While TRACER is hopeful that the Telecommunications Act of
14 1996² ("1996 Act") will make it possible for meaningful local
15 exchange competition to develop, it believes this independent
16 proceeding to be of substantial significance and worthy of
17 expedited consideration. The full development of the wireless
18 industry, particularly PCS, is dependent on carriers' ability to
19 devise and carry out business plans to activate their systems.
20 Major Trading Area ("MTA") licensees have already paid nearly \$8
21 billion just for the right to offer service. They are currently
22 investing billions more to build out their systems to bring two
23 more facility-based wireless carriers to every market. Basic
24 Trading Area ("BTA") licensees will soon be determined and will
25 face similar financial and operational challenges. These PCS

26 ² Public Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat, 56 (1996).

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1 licensees have indicated intentions to eventually compete for a
2 share of the local exchange market. Eliminating unnecessary
3 interconnection costs for these PCS carriers will greatly enhance
4 the speed with which they can come to the market and compete
5 effectively with LECs.³ Moreover, the sooner interconnection
6 rates can be brought closer to cost, the sooner competition
7 between all wireless carriers, incumbent and new, can drive down
8 wireless prices -- by at least the amount that incumbents
9 currently overpay LECs.

10 Contrary to the claims of the LECs, passage of the 1996 Act
11 should not be viewed as an opportunity to combine this proceeding
12 with proceedings under new Sections 251 and 252. Section 332
13 provides sufficient jurisdictional basis for the Commission to
14 undertake this proceeding absent any new authority granted by the
15 1996 Act. State-Federal jurisdictional balance over rate and
16 entry issues for the wireless industry was repositioned in 1993;⁴
17 the 1996 Act left this largely unchanged. Congressional intent
18 to retain the pre-1996 Act State-Federal balance with regard to
19

20 ³ For example, Sprint Spectrum and American Personal
21 Communications report that "PCS licensees need certainty as they
22 engineer, construct and launch their networks, and the terms and
23 conditions upon which they will interconnect with local exchange
carriers are crucial to every step of this process." Joint
Comments of Sprint Spectrum and American Personal Communications
at 6. See, also, Comments of Omnipoint Corporation at 2.

24 ⁴ Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).

1 CMRS is confirmed by the plain language of Section 253⁵ and by
2 Section 251(i), which preserves Commission jurisdictional
3 authority over interconnection pursuant to Section 201, the
4 provision on which this proceeding is based. Should the
5 Commission have any doubt about its rights in this area, it
6 should note that under Chevron it has wide discretion in making
7 such determinations.⁶ And, as mentioned, supra, there are
8 significant policy considerations supporting a Commission
9 interpretation that this proceeding need not end as a result of
10 the 1996 Act.

11 II. COMPENSATION FOR INTERCONNECTION TRAFFIC BETWEEN LECs AND
12 CMRS PROVIDERS' NETWORKS.

13 The current inequitable system of high, non-cost-based rates
14 paid by CMRS providers to LECs, without reciprocal compensation,
15 must be replaced. Bill and keep is the superior arrangement for
16 such compensation.

17 A. Compensation Arrangements.

- 18 1. Existing compensation arrangements are based on
19 unequal bargaining positions, not on any rational
20 economic basis.

21 If existing interconnection agreements between LECs and CMRS
22 providers were fair, there would be no need for this proceeding.

23 ⁵ Section 253 generally concerns removal of state and local
24 barriers to entry. Section 253(i) specifically states that
25 "[n]othing in this section shall affect the application of
section 332 (c) (3) to commercial mobile service providers."
Section 332 (c) (3) concerns preemption of state CMRS rate and
entry regulation.

26 ⁶ Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).

1 Likewise, if interconnection agreements between LECs and CLECs
2 were fair, need for Sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act would
3 also be significantly reduced. However, economic theory dictates
4 that these arrangements will never be fair until competing
5 networks, wireline or otherwise, serve a number of end users at
6 least slightly comparable to that served by the LECs. It is the
7 consumer who ends up paying the price for the results of this
8 disparity in bargaining power.

9 Today, LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements are left to
10 voluntary negotiations. For any negotiation to produce a fair
11 outcome, the parties must be at least in comparable bargaining
12 positions. This is not the case when LECs and CMRS providers
13 negotiate interconnection rates. A bargaining position is only
14 as good as one's best alternative to a negotiated agreement. For
15 a LEC, this is to continue a monopoly over local telephone
16 service and lose the ability to offer wireline customers access
17 to approximately five or six percent of the population in its
18 service area when they are unreachable by landline phone.⁷ By
19 contrast, a CMRS provider will, at best, be able to offer its
20 customers calling options to less than seven percent of the
21 population in the area when the terminating parties have their
22 wireless devices activated, assuming that they have direct CMRS-
23 CMRS interconnection arrangements, which at this time is

24
25 ⁷ Paul Kagan Associates estimates that there are
26 approximately 34 million wireless customers, roughly 13 percent
of the population. If one assumes a 50 percent market share (for
markets that do not have Enhanced Specialized Mobile Radio or PCS
carriers), this would be 6.5 percent.

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1 extremely uncommon.⁸ Not only are their best alternatives far
2 from equal, so is the impact of the price set during such
3 negotiations. Because CMRS carriers serve relatively few end
4 users as compared to LECs, a higher portion of their overall
5 operating expenses would theoretically be spent on inter-
6 connection. LECs, reaching far more end users, are
7 significantly less concerned with the rates that they would pay
8 CMRS carriers, which according to CMRS carrier comments, happens
9 rarely, if ever.⁹ All the LECs would be losing is a revenue
10 opportunity at little cost.

11 For interconnection to be priced efficiently, at least in
12 the static sense, price should reflect total service long-run
13 incremental cost ("TSLRIC"), and be as close to TSLRIC as
14 possible.¹⁰ Accounting for the proportion of time that
15 terminating traffic actually imposes costs, it has been estimated
16 that LEC termination costs, on average, are \$.002 per minute.¹¹

17
18 ⁸ See Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to
19 Commercial Mobile Radio Services. CC Docket No. 94-54, Second
20 Notice of Proposed Rule Making (April 5, 1995) at para. 37.

21 ⁹ See e.g., Comments of AT&T Corp. at 8.

22 ¹⁰ See Steven R. Brenner & Bridger M. Mitchell, Economic
23 Issues in the Choice of Compensation Arrangements for
24 Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial
25 Mobile Radio Service Providers, filed as part of Comments by
CTIA, March 4, 1996 ("Brenner & Mitchell") at 21. Brenner &
Mitchell use the term "marginal" cost, but note at page 25, note
25, that their paper does not specifically address whether the
costs to be measured should be short-run or long-run, marginal or
service incremental. TRACER believes the proper measure should
be TSLRIC.

26 ¹¹ See "Incremental Cost of Local Usage," Gerald W. Brock,
filed in CC Docket 94-54 on March 21, 1995.

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1 While CMRS termination costs have not been fully detailed at this
2 time, there is no reason to believe that they are not at least
3 equal to this \$.002 per minute, if not more.

4 Traffic balance is a complicated, dynamic issue. While
5 traffic between CMRS providers and LECs is currently generally
6 skewed in the direction of LEC termination,¹² there are many
7 reasons to believe that this situation will soon change. The
8 nation's first PCS provider to activate its system, American
9 Personal Communications ("APC," operating as Sprint Spectrum),
10 reports a roughly even termination traffic split.¹³ APC cites
11 four reasons why it has a more even balance of terminating
12 traffic with the LEC than cellular carriers: APC does not charge
13 its customers for the first minute of incoming calls; APC offers
14 caller ID as part of its basic service package; APC handsets have
15 significantly longer battery life; and all unanswered calls are
16 routed to voicemail.¹⁴ If other PCS carriers, and eventually
17 cellular carriers, follow the lead of APC, traffic on a nation-
18 wide basis should approach an even split. And even if traffic
19 balance is not approximately equal, it should be kept in mind

20
21 ¹² When evaluating traffic balance proportions, it is
22 important to note that only terminating traffic that contributes
23 to a network's peak load imposes costs. See Brenner & Mitchell.
24 Brenner & Mitchell estimate that a typical traffic balance may
25 have to be adjusted by at least 14 percent (e.g., from a 75/25
balance in favor of the LEC to a 61/39 balance in favor of the
LEC) in favor of CMRS terminating traffic to account for
noncoincidental peak periods and differing extremes of peak
traffic (variance of peak versus off-peak traffic). Id.

26 ¹³ Comments of American Personal Communications at p. 6.

¹⁴ Id. at 10

1 that the dynamic efficiency effect of forward-looking policies,
2 such as bill and keep, will create an environment in which
3 traffic will be balanced.

4 Given the obviously uneven bargaining power of LECs and CMRS
5 providers, the claims set forth in CMRS carrier comments
6 concerning the discriminatory nature of their interconnection
7 agreements with LECs are likely to be accurate. While traffic
8 termination really only costs LECs a typical \$.002 per minute,
9 the average per minute interconnection rate paid by cellular
10 companies to LECs is \$.03 per minute (15 times cost).¹⁵
11 Meanwhile, virtually no CMRS carriers report receiving payments
12 for LEC traffic that they terminate on their systems, despite
13 CMRS providers' practically unenforceable rights as
14 co-carriers.¹⁶

15 Sometimes, these inequities are even worse. For example,
16 Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc. reports an instance where it has
17 had to pay New England Telephone Company \$.11 per minute, even
18 though the cost of providing the interconnection service was only
19 \$.0057 per minute at the peak hour.¹⁷ Vanguard does not

20 ¹⁵ See Interconnection Compensation Perspective,
21 Malarkey-Taylor Associates, Inc. handout prepared for PCIA
22 Leg/Reg/WINC Meeting, February 8, 1996.

23 ¹⁶ The Commission clarified that LECs should compensate for
24 CMRS-terminated traffic as part of Need to Promote Competition
25 and Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio Common Carrier Services,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 RR 2d 1275 (1986), clarified,
Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd 2910 (1987), aff'd on recon. 4 FCC
Rcd 2369 (1989).

26 ¹⁷ Comments of Vanguard Cellular System, Inc. at 8.

1 receive any sort of compensation for the New England Telephone
2 Company traffic that it terminates.¹⁸ Apparently, some carriers
3 even have to pay LECs for the right to terminate LEC traffic.¹⁹

4 CMRS carriers are not the only victims of this discrimina-
5 tion. The ultimate victim is the consumer. Wireless consumers
6 are forced to pay these \$.03 per minute charges, frequently
7 reflected as \$.10 per call on a wireless bill, based on average
8 call length. LEC customers who do not yet own wireless phones
9 suffer in two ways--they are deterred from subscribing to
10 wireless service because of unnecessarily high prices, and the
11 potential benefits of eventual local telephone competition by
12 wireless carriers are delayed, if not precluded.

13 2. Bill and keep is a superior system for inter-
14 connection compensation between LECs and CMRS
15 providers than any usage-based system (such as the
status quo).

16 As a matter of fact, a system will be in off-peak periods
17 for all but very few hours per day.²⁰ Terminating traffic during
18 these periods does not impose any usage-based cost to the
19 terminating carrier.²¹ To avoid problems of peak shifting and to
20 minimize deadweight loss (resulting from inefficient price
21 signals), usage-sensitive pricing schemes must have a sliding

22 ¹⁸ Id. at 7.

23 ¹⁹ Brenner & Mitchell at 8.

24 ²⁰ It should be noted that actual traffic peaks cover much
25 rower time periods than peak billing periods, which represent
26 attempts at averaging cost-recovery for above-average usage
narrower time periods.

²¹ Brenner & Mitchell at 12.

1 price scale with several price levels.²² Such schemes would be
2 difficult to implement, not to mention being highly unpopular
3 with consumers.

4 Nevertheless, it has been estimated that the LEC peak hour
5 accounts for only slightly more than ten percent of daily LEC
6 traffic.²³ Thus, nine out of ten calls can be handled by the LEC
7 at no additional cost.

8 How much CMRS traffic actually strains LECs during peak
9 periods, as compared to the strains LECs impose on CMRS providers
10 during CMRS peak periods, will take much further study.²⁴

11 a. Bill and keep as compared with mutual
12 compensation.

13 Setting any price to be charged on a usage-sensitive basis
14 poses many hazards, even if the price is the same for both
15 directions of traffic flow.

16 As noted, supra, LEC operating costs are much less sensitive
17 to interconnection rates than CMRS operating costs. This
18 provides LECs with a great incentive to seek high interconnection
19 rates. While LECs will be paying these overly high charges, so
20 will CMRS carriers. Because CMRS total operating costs are more
21 dependent on interconnection rates, CMRS will be competitively
22 disadvantaged. Through these means, LECs will be able to

23 ²² Id. at 28.

24 ²³ Id. at 16.

25 ²⁴ Id. at 17.

1 discourage potential local exchange competition by the wireless
2 carriers.

3 Also, because a higher proportion of a CMRS provider's
4 overall costs will be based on interconnection rates that will a
5 LEC's, the CMRS provider's retail price structure will have to be
6 based more on the interconnection pricing structure, as opposed
7 to the structure of its own underlying costs. In other words,
8 the CMRS provider's overall costs would be more usage sensitive
9 than the LEC's, solely because of the structure of
10 interconnection prices. Because of this, the CMRS provider will
11 have a much greater difficulty offering flat-rated retail
12 prices.²⁵ This will hurt the CMRS provider in competing for
13 customers who prefer flat rates. This would certainly be the
14 case for such customers with greater than average usage.
15 Furthermore, if CMRS providers are forced to price retail
16 services on a usage-sensitive basis while LECs are not, then CMRS
17 providers will also face additional transactional costs the LECs
18 do not.

19 Bill and keep is a safe and superior alternative to mutual
20 compensation. Teleport Communications Group, Inc., a firm with
21 great experience negotiating interconnection arrangements with
22 LECs, argues in its comments that "[evidence in some states has
23 suggested that the costs of the billing systems to assess such

24 ²⁵ Brenner & Mitchell at 44-47.

1 per minute charges roughly equal the costs of the interconnection
2 itself . . . "26 Given what interconnection actually costs, this
3 is not surprising.

4 Bill and keep avoids the perils of over-priced usage-
5 sensitive pricing. It also makes a lot more sense on an interim
6 basis than mutual compensation, because it avoids the non-
7 refundable, upfront, transactional costs that CMRS carriers must
8 endure as part of a mutual compensation arrangement.

9 The only potential advantage of a mutual compensation scheme
10 is that it accounts for supposedly unbalanced cost obligations
11 resulting from traffic imbalance. As discussed, supra, there are
12 reasons to expect traffic to become more balanced. Temporary
13 unequal cost obligations may very well be less than the
14 transactional cost of a system designed to avoid them.

15 Additionally, the efficiencies promoted by a bill and keep
16 scheme may significantly reduce any remaining advantage to a
17 mutual compensation arrangement. When fixed relationships are
18 developed between price and cost, service providers lose the
19 incentive to reduce inefficiencies, because they know that they
20 will be compensated for the associated costs. If the true cost
21 of interconnection should approach zero, then it makes sense to
22 set the price at zero. Eventually, costs will fall closer to
23 this price.²⁷

24 ²⁶ Id. at 9.

25 ²⁷ However, it should be noted that while the "price" of
26 interconnection under bill and keep is zero, termination services

1 b. Bill and keep as compared with the status quo.

2 As discussed, supra, the status quo is the reflection of
3 decades of bottleneck control by the LECs. Also as discussed,
4 supra, bill and keep is a fair, efficient system, certainly on an
5 interim basis. After the interim period, the system can be
6 adjusted, if necessary, to reflect further economic study and
7 changes in the marketplace.

8 c. Pricing of dedicated facilities.

9 Dedicated facilities should also not be priced on a per-
10 minute basis. Not only would such a system impose administrative
11 costs, but it would not reflect the generally static nature of
12 the dedicated facility costs based on usage.²⁸ As traffic may be
13 moving in the direction of an even flow, it seems reasonable that
14 such dedicated facility costs be equally born by carriers on both
15 ends of the connection.

16 B. Implementation of Compensation Arrangements.

17 1. Negotiation and tariffing.

18 (No comments at this time]

19 2. Jurisdictional issues.

20 The 1993 amendments to Section 332 recognized the national
21 _____
22 are not free--the originating carrier assumes a reciprocal duty
23 to terminate traffic sent to its system; in other words, each
24 carrier incurs a cost in exchange for receiving interconnection
25 services.

26 ²⁸ While use might increase dedicated facility cost in a
step fashion, it would be difficult to construct a pricing
mechanism that adequately reflects this.

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1 interest in CMRS service. At the same time, Section 2(b) was
2 amended to give the FCC authority over intrastate CMRS service.²⁹
3 Congress recognized that to effectuate the national goal of a
4 competitive ubiquitous wireless network, rates and entry for the
5 CMRS industry should be governed at the Federal level. State
6 regulation of LEC-CMRS interconnection rates is fundamentally
7 inconsistent with the statutory goal of a nationwide CMRS market
8 where the rapid deployment of wireless technology is encouraged.
9 This consideration is significant given the wide latitude that
10 the Commission and other Federal agencies have been given in
11 carrying out their delegated authority pursuant to Chevron.

12 III. INTERCONNECTION FOR THE ORIGINATION AND TERMINATION OF
13 INTERSTATE INTEREXCHANGE TRAFFIC.

14 Although TRACER does not seek to offer comments on this
15 issue at this time, it wishes to point out that CMRS and IXC
16 markets are both increasingly competitive and should be treated
17 as such.

18 IV. APPLICATION OF THESE PROPOSALS.

19 The Commission should apply the interconnection
20 compensation rules that it adopts to all CMRS providers, in
21 conformance with the regulatory parity provisions of Section
22 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the
23 corresponding CMRS Second Report.³⁰ Such broad application will

24 ²⁹ 47 U.S.C. 153(b) (Section 2(b) of the Communications Act
25 of 1934).

26 ³⁰ 9 FCC Rcd 1411 (1994).

1 ensure maximum competition in the converging elements of the
2 wireless industry.

3 V. OTHER.

4 (No comments at this time]


5 VI. CONCLUSION.

6 The time has come to reform monopoly-based business
7 arrangements in the telecommunications industry and move toward a
8 competitive system. Consistent with the goals of the recently
9 passed 1996 Act, the Commissions' bill and keep proposal will
10 increase competition in both the wireless and local exchange
11 markets. For this reason, TRACER strongly advocates immediate
12 adoption of bill and keep, at least on an interim basis.

13 Respectfully submitted,

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